QUESTION 7 It can be rational to play titfortat in a repeate

QUESTION 7 It can be rational to play tit-for-tat in a repeated Prisoner\'s Dilemma game O only if the game is played an infinite number of times O if the game is played an infinite number of times, or if it is uncertain how many times it will be played. O only if the game is played a finite number of times, and that number is known by all the players in advance at no time, tit-for-tat is an irrational strategy in this situation QUESTION 8 The players in a game theory situation often do not act in their joint interest because of which of the following? O They do not realize the benefit of cooperation. O Players strive to minimize their opponents\' profits. O Players do not understand the game and its payoffs. O It is not in each player\'s self-interest to cooperate

Solution

7. It can be rational to play tit-for-tat in a repeated Prisoners Dilemma game

If the game is played an infinite number of times, or if it is uncertain how many number of times it will be played.

A tit-for-tat strategy would be optimal in earlier rounds. In case of finite number of rounds this strategy is not optimal.

The unravelling of the game doesn\'t necessarily happen of the game is repeated infinite number of times. Hence, tit-for-tat strategy is optimal in this environment.

8. All the players are interested in their own interest. Each firm is interested in maximizing their market share and revenue. Therefore they are not interested in joint interest that is cooperation.

Answer: it is not in each players self interest to cooperate.