Stony Brook University US httpsblackboardstonybrookeduwebapp

Stony Brook University (US) https://blackboard.stonybrook.edu/webapps assessm search - Question Completion Status: QUESTION 9 1 O 2,2,2 x 3, 2, 1 5, 0, 0 -1,2,6 -7,5,5 4, 3,1 Consider the following extensive form game of complete and imperfect information between players 1, 2, and 3. The following strategy profiles are Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria (Please, select all that apply) QUESTION 10 Click Save and Submit to save and submit. Click Save All Answers to save all Save All Answers 1-T

Solution

Answer-

a. (I, C, X): It is a subgame equilibrium , I then C then X is the best option.

b. (O, B, X):It is a subgame equilibrium  , O is always in equilibrium.

c. (I, A, X): It is a subgame equilibrium , I then A then X is the best option.

d. (I, B, Y): It is a subgame equilibrium, I then B then Y is the best option.

e. (O, B, Y): It is a subgame equilibrium , O is always in equilibrium.