INSTRUCTIONS This paper contsins SIX questions Candidates sh
Solution
u(w,e)=w1/2-e
where w is agent\'s payment
e=agent\'s effort level
Reservation utility is given by u-=2
eH=2 and eL=1
H is high level effort
L is low level effort
Two outcomes are possible
yH having the probablity equal to pH=1/2 conditional on high effort
and yL having the probablity equal to pL=1/4 conditional on low effort
a) If principal desires low effort
the eL=1 and the probablity is equal to 1/4
u(w,e)=w1/2-1
and reservation utility is equal to 2
2=w1/2-1
2+1=u1/2
3=u1/2
u=9
For low effort workers the optimal contract offered is equal to 9.
If principal desires high effort
u(w,e)=e1/2-2
2=e1/2-2
2+2=e1/2
4=e1/2
e=16
the contract offered to high effort workers is equal to 16.
b) The gap must be equal to 16-9=7
QUESTION FOUR
The production function is given by
q=40EH+30EL and sells its output at 10 per unit.
H type workers have high productivity and L type workers have low productivity.
EH+EL=10 (given)
pq=10*(40EH+30EL)
a)we differentiate with respect to EH and EL respectively.
when we differentiate with respect to EH we get
=400
and when we differentiate with respect to EL we get
=300
So H- type earn 400 and L- type earn 300.
b) When the firm is not able to distinguish between the two types workers they offer the lower wages due to information asymetry between high productivity and low productivity workers which is equal to 300.
c) Those workers having educational degrees in their hand help the firm to eliminate the situation of asymetry information and those workers will be offered high wages because firms assume that educated workers are more productive than the uneducated workers.

