Homework Sourse0100 1010 550 505 505 550 Part 1 Consider the game illustrat
(0-100) (10.10) (5,50) (50,5) (50,5) (5,50) Part 1: Consider the game illustrated above 1) How many strategies does each player have? 2) (Choose a-d and justify your answer) The game is one of a) perfect information b) imperfect information c) complete information d) incomplete information 3) Find the Nash equilibrium 4) Which of the Nash Equilibria are subgame perfect? 
Solution
Solution:
1) Strategies each player has:
Player 1 : 3
Player 2: 4
2) d) Incomplete Information
3) Nash equilibriuum are: (10,10); (5,50); (50,5)
4) Subgame perfect nash equlibrium is (10,10)
