Consider the stage game below and suppose it is repeated twi
Consider the stage game below and suppose it is repeated twice
Consider the stage game above and suppose it is repeated twice
The following strategy profiles are stage Nash equilibria (select all that apply)
(B,F)
(C,E)
(A,D)
(C,D)
(A,F)
(B,E)
| a. | (B,F) | |
| b. | (C,E) | |
| c. | (A,D) | |
| d. | (C,D) | |
| e. | (A,F) | |
| f. | (B,E) |
Solution
The correct option is d)
Reason:
FOr player i strategy A and B are sdominated to strategy C. Tht is player 1 will always paly C. For Player 2 strategy D is strictly dominant therefore will always choose D.
