Consider a repeated game in which the stage game above is re

Consider a repeated game in which the stage game above is repeated twice and there is no discounting. The following are SPNE outcomes in the repeated game (select all that apply)

(C,F) in the first period, (C,F) in the second period.

(B,F) in the first period, (B,F) in the second period.

(A,D) in the first period, (A,D) in the second period.

(B,F) in the first period, (C,E) in the second period

you can select more than one answer

	a.	(C,F) in the first period, (C,F) in the second period.
	b.	(B,F) in the first period, (B,F) in the second period.
	c.	(A,D) in the first period, (A,D) in the second period.
	d.	(B,F) in the first period, (C,E) in the second period

Player lI 6,6 2,7 2,-2 Player B 7,-4 -2,-2 1,-1 C 2,-2 1,1 1,1

Solution

There are 3 Nash equilibria here and these are given by (C,E),(B,F) and (C,F). Thus the correct answers in this case would be A,B and D.