32 Consider the extensive form game above where Player 1 has

3,2 Consider the extensive form game above, where Player 1 has 4 possible actions: u,d, t, s, and Player 2 has 4 possible actions: A, B, C, D. The strategy profile(ds, Bc)l a payoff of backward induction solution Player 2 gets a payoff of for Player 1 and for Player 2. The number of Nash equilibria in pure strategies is and in (Please, enter only numerical values like: 0, 1,2, 3,... QUESTION 6 3, 0 8, 5 x- 4,6 2, 1 6, 4 2 3,2 Consider the extensive form game of complete and imperfect information above. The number of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the game is (Please, type only numerical QUESTION 7 Click Save and Submit to save and submit. Click Save All Answers to save all answers Save All Answers 2a We

Solution

2

It is mentioned in the question that only the numerical value needs to be typed.