Read the article summarize the article 1 paragraph answer h

.

Read the article

summarize the article (1 paragraph)

answer how this article relates to the class material? (1-2 paragraphs)

critic the article - what is lacking or what could the article do better or did they skip over or miss an important part of this topic   (1 paragraph)

Nine Habits That Lead

to Terrible Decisions

by Jack Zenger and Joseph Folkman

Some possibilities immediately came to

mind: People make poor decisions when they

are under severe time pressure or don’t have

access to all of the important information (unless

they are explaining the decision to their

boss, and then it is often someone else’s fault).

But we wanted a more objective answer. To

understand the root causes of poor decision

making, we looked at 360-degree feedback data

from more than 50,000 leaders and compared

the behavior of those who were perceived to be

making poor decisions with that of the people

who were perceived to be making good decisions.

We did a factor analysis of the behaviors

that showed the greatest statistical diNerence

between the best and worst decision makers.

Nine factors emerged as the most common

paths to poor decision making. Here they are in

order from most to least signiOcant.

1. Being lazy. When people failed to check

facts, take the initiative, conOrm assumptions,

or gather additional input, they were perceived

to be sloppy in their work and unwilling to put

themselves out. They relied on past experience

and expected results simply to be an extrapolation

of the past.

SEVERAL YEARS ago we came up with a great idea for a new leadershipdevelopment

oNering. We had research showing that when people embarked

on a self-development program, their success increased dramatically when

they received follow-up encouragement. We developed a software application

to oNer that sort of encouragement. People could enter their development

goals, and to motivate them to keep going, the software would send

them reminders every week or month asking how they were doing. We invested

a lot of time and money in this product.

But it turned out that people didn’t like receiving the e-mails and found

them more annoying than motivating. Some of our users came up with a

name for this type of software: “nagware.” Needless to say, this product never

reached the potential we had envisioned. Thinking about our decisions to

create this ultimately disappointing software application, we asked ourselves,

What causes well-meaning people (like us) to make poor decisions?

LOGIC

FROM HBR.ORG

VOICES

Getty Images

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Harvard Business Review OnPoint 23

2. Not anticipating unexpected

events. It is discouraging to always consider

the possibility of negative events

in our lives, so most people assume the

worst will not happen. Unfortunately,

bad things happen fairly often. People

die, get divorced, and have accidents.

Markets crash, home prices go down,

and friends are unreliable. There is excellent

research demonstrating that when

people take the time to consider what

might go wrong, they are actually good at

anticipating problems. But many people

get so excited about their decisions that

they never allow time for that simple

due diligence.

3. Not making a decision. At the

other end of the scale, when people

are faced with a complex decision that

will be based on constantly changing

data, it’s easy to continue to study the

data, ask for one more report, or perform

yet another analysis before choosing a

course of action. When the reports and

the analysis take much longer than expected,

poor decision makers delay, and

the opportunity is missed. It takes courage

to look at the data, consider the consequences

responsibly, and then move

forward. Indecision is often worse than

making the wrong decision. The people

most paralyzed by fear are those who

believe that one mistake will ruin their

careers, so they avoid any risk at all.

4. Remaining locked in the past.

Some people make poor decisions because

they’re using the same old data

or processes they always have. They get

used to approaches that worked in the

past and tend not to look for better ones

(the devil they know rather than the one

they don’t). But, too often, when a decision

is destined to go wrong, it’s because

the old process is based on assumptions

that are no longer true. Poor decision

makers fail to reLect on those assumptions

when applying the tried and true.

5. Having no strategic alignment.

Bad decisions sometimes stem from

a failure to connect the problem to an

overall strategy. Without a clear strategy

that provides context, many solutions

appear to make sense. When tightly

linked to a clear strategy, the better solutions

quickly begin to rise to the top.

6. Depending too much on others.

Some decisions are never made, because

one person is waiting for another, who in

turn is waiting for someone else’s decision

or input. ENective decision makers

Ond a way to act independently when

necessary.

7. Remaining isolated. Some leaders

are waiting for input because they

haven’t taken steps to get it in a timely

manner or haven’t established the relationships

that would enable them to

draw on other people’s expertise when

they need it. All of our (and many others’)

research on eNective decision making

recognizes that involving others who

have the relevant knowledge, experience,

and expertise improves the quality

of the decision. That truth is not news,

but why is it true? Sometimes people

lack the necessary networking skills to

access the right information. Other times,

we’ve found, people do not involve others

because they want the credit for a

decision. Unfortunately, they also get to

take the blame for the bad decisions.

8. Lacking technical depth. Organizations

today are complex, and even the

best leaders don’t have enough technical

depth to fully understand multifaceted

issues. But when decision makers rely on

others’ knowledge and expertise without

any perspective of their own, they have

a diYcult time integrating that information

to make eNective decisions. And

when they lack even basic knowledge

and expertise, they have no way to tell

whether a decision is brilliant or terrible.

We continue to Ond that the best executives

have deep expertise. And if they

don’t have the technical depth to understand

the implications of the decisions

they face, they make it their business to

Ond the talent they need to help them.

9. Failing to communicate the what,

where, when, and how associated

with their decisions. Some good decisions

become bad decisions because

people don’t understand—or even know

about—them. Communicating a decision,

and its rationale and implications,

is critical to implementing it successfully.

It’s no wonder good people make bad

decisions if they fail to get others’ input

in time, to get the right input at the right

time, to understand that input (because

of insufficient skills), to understand

when something that worked in the

past will not work now, to know when

to make a decision without all the right

information and when to wait for more

advice. The path to good decision making

is narrow, and it’s far from straight.

But keeping this list of pitfalls in mind

can make any leader a more eNective decision

maker.

Originally published on HBR.org

September 1, 2014

Jack Zenger is the CEO and

Joseph Folkman is the president of

Zenger Folkman, a leadership development

consultancy. They are coauthors of the

article “Making Yourself Indispensable”

(HBR, October 2011) and the book How

to Be Exceptional: Drive Leadership

Success by Magnifying Your Strengths

(McGraw-Hill, 2012).

READER COMMENTS

The biggest—and most common—bad

habit is missing from this list: not asking

others before a decision is made. If

you see a problem from several people’s

perspectives, it is like seeing a 3-D image

instead of a flat one. And if work must be

done to realize the vision, sharing that

workload and spreading the vision of what

success looks like makes the difference

between success and failure.

—Peter Johnston,

commercial director, Datatest

Indecision is

often worse

than making the

wrong decision.

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FROM HBR.ORG

VOICES

Unless sufficient time is allowed for the

proper decision-making process, failure

will prevail. Too many business decisions

are performed in the pressure cooker of

office dynamics.

—Fiona MacCarthy, director,

Mastercraft Enterprises

These habits have been allowed to develop

because the process of decision making

has not been systematized and the

decision makers have never been trained

in how to make them methodically. How

many organizations have decision-making

methodologies and frameworks that they

regularly use? Most probably just assume

that their decision makers know how to

make decisions.

—Richard Davis, senior vice president

and COO, Katalyst Data Management

Relearning the

Art of Asking

Questions

by Tom Pohlmann and

Neethi Mary Thomas

PROPER QUESTIONING has become a

lost art. The curious four-year-old asks

a lot of questions—incessant streams of

“Why?” and “Why not?” might sound familiar—but

as we grow older, our questioning

decreases. In a recent poll of

more than 200 of our clients, we found

that those with children estimated that

70% to 80% of their kids’ dialogues with

others included questions. But those

same clients said that only 15% to 25% of

their own interactions consisted of questions.

Why the drop-oN?

Think back to your childhood.

Chances are, you received the most recognition

or rewards when you got the

correct answers. Later in life, that incentive

continues. At work, we often reward

people who answer questions, not those

who ask them. Questioning conventional

wisdom can even lead to being sidelined,

isolated, or considered a threat.

Because expectations for decision

making have gone from “get it done soon”

to “get it done now” to “it should have

been done yesterday,” we tend to jump

to conclusions instead of asking more

questions. The unfortunate side eNect

of not asking enough questions is poor

decision making. That’s why it’s imperative

that we slow down and take the time

to ask more—and better—questions. At

best, we’ll arrive at better conclusions; at

worst, we’ll avoid a lot of rework later on.

Aside from not speaking up enough,

many professionals don’t think about

how diNerent types of questions can lead

to diNerent outcomes. You should steer

a conversation by asking the right kinds

of questions for the problem you’re trying

to solve. In some cases, you’ll want to

expand your view of the problem, rather

than keeping it narrowly focused. In

others, you’ll want to challenge basic assumptions

or aYrm your understanding

in order to feel more conOdent in your

conclusions.

Consider four types of questions—

clarifying, adjoining, funneling, and elevating—each

aimed at achieving a different

goal.

Clarifying questions help us better

understand what has been said. In

many conversations, people speak past

one another. Asking clarifying questions

can help uncover the real intent. This

helps us understand one another better

and leads us to ask relevant follow-up

questions. Both “Can you tell me more?”

and “Why do you say so?” fall into this

category. People often don’t ask these

questions; they typically make assumptions

and complete any missing parts

themselves.

Adjoining questions are used to explore

related aspects of the problem that

are ignored in the conversation. Questions

such as, “How would this concept

apply in a diNerent context?” or “What

are the related uses of this technology?”

fall into this category. For example, asking

“How would these insights apply in

Canada?” during a discussion on customer

lifetime value in the U.S. can open

a useful discussion on behavioral diNer-

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Harvard Business Review OnPoint 25

ences between customers in the U.S. and

Canada. Our laserlike focus on immediate

tasks often inhibits our asking more

of these exploratory questions, even

though they could help us broaden our

understanding of an issue.

Funneling questions are used to dive

deeper. We ask these to understand how

an answer was derived, to challenge assumptions,

and to understand the root

causes of problems. Examples include

“How did you do the analysis?” and

“Why didn’t you include this step?” Funneling

can naturally follow the design of

an organization and its oNerings, such

as, “Can we take this analysis of outdoor

products and apply it to a certain

brand of lawn furniture?” Most analytical

teams—especially those embedded

in business operations—do an excellent

job of using these questions.

Elevating questions raise broader

issues and highlight the bigger picture.

They help you zoom out. Being too immersed

in an immediate problem makes

it harder to see the overall context behind

it. So you can ask, “Taking a step

back, what are the larger issues?” or “Are

we even addressing the right question?”

For example, a discussion on issues such

as margin decline and decreasing customer

satisfaction could turn into a more

in-depth discussion of corporate strategy

with an elevating question: “Instead

of talking about these issues separately,

what are the larger trends we should be

concerned about? How do they all tie

together?” These questions take us to a

higher playing Oeld, where we can better

see connections between individual

problems.

In today’s always-on world, there’s a

rush to answer. Ubiquitous access to data

and volatile business demands accelerate

this sense of urgency. But we must

slow down and understand one another

better to avoid poor decisions and succeed

in this environment. Because asking

questions requires a certain amount

of vulnerability, corporate cultures must

shift to promote this behavior. Leaders

should encourage people to ask more

questions, relevant to the desired goals,

instead of rushing them to deliver answers.

To make the right decisions, start

asking the questions that really matter.

Originally published on HBR.org

March 27, 2015

Tom Pohlmann is the head of values and

strategy at Mu Sigma. He was formerly

the chief marketing and strategy officer

for Forrester Research and previously led

the company’s largest business unit and

all of its technology research. Neethi

Mary Thomas is the senior engagement

manager at Mu Sigma, where she leads

global engagements for Fortune 500 and

hypergrowth clients on the West Coast.

READER COMMENTS

Leaders often ask questions that start with

“Do you know what I...” (Do you know what

I mean? Do you know what I want? Do you

know what I said?) These questions presume

the listener knows, but is that reasonable?

No, because yes is almost always the

answer. No one wants to tell the boss they

don’t know what he just said. The problem

and the fix reside with the boss. Too many

leaders and managers speak too quickly.

People hear what they hear and remember

what they remember, often inaccurately.

—Robert F. Gately

strategic business partner,

Profiles International | Gately Consulting

Asking “stupid” questions is often a matter

of addressing what others want—but

don’t dare—to ask. If you ask a stupid

question and provide feedback—in words,

sometimes followed by relevant action—

you demonstrate understanding and

empower others to do the same. You will

look smart, except to people who aren’t

thinking clearly at the moment. What’s

more, you might avoid making a mistake,

or better yet, do something great. Smart

people would rather risk looking stupid

than be stupid.

—Jose Harris, principal systems engineer,

LinQuest Corporation

Preparing for

Decision-Making

Meetings

by Stever Robbins

TIM’S E-MAIL seemed like an innocentenough

request. “Our graphic designer

missed this week’s deadline. Gather in

the conference room at 10 to decide what

to do.” Because he never actually said

“meeting,” Tim’s message caught me oN

guard. “Gather” sounded like a family

picnic, with golden retrievers and frolicking.

Nothing could have been further

from the truth.

In the conference room, comments

started Lying. “Our proofs are always

late!” “Maybe we should switch designers.”

“Have we thought to ask for regular

status reports?” “Our current designer is

too expensive.” “Are we trying to Ox the

designer, or Ogure out what to do to get

back on schedule?” We were having a

ball venting, but after an hour, we hadn’t

made much progress. We merely wasted

everyone’s time.

Every decision-making conversation

has three hidden conversations lurking

just out of sight. One is about what we’re

trying to accomplish by even bothering

to make a decision; after all, we could

just let things fall where they may. The

second is about the criteria we’ll use to

make the decision. The third is about

Onding and choosing among diNerent

Getty Images

options.

People jump

to conclusions

instead of asking

questions.

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FROM HBR.ORG

VOICES

It’s easy to let those conversations become

intertwined. In the meeting we’ve

just described, all three conversations

got jumbled. Decision criteria such as

on-time delivery and cost got mixed up

with possible options, such as switching

designers and asking for status reports.

No one even followed up on the question

of why we were there: to evaluate the designer

or just recover from a schedule slip.

My Orst boss once said, “Never call

a meeting to make a decision. Work

with people one-on-one, and then call

the meeting to let the group share and

own the decision that’s been made.” It

was great advice. Even if you can’t make

the decision airtight before the meeting,

you’ll save time in the long run by having

short individual conversations with

team members to frame the discussion.

Chat with each team member before

the meeting. Use those talks to reach

alignment—or identify areas of contention—on

the three conversations.

Ask what each person thinks the decision

should accomplish, what criteria

are most important, and what options

should be considered. Here is how Tim’s

conversation with me could have gone.

Tim: We’re meeting to discuss what

to do about the designer’s schedule slip.

What do you think the purpose of the

meeting should be?

Stever: Let’s Ogure out what to do to

get back on schedule. Before the next

project, we can decide if we want to stay

with the same designer.

Tim: What criteria should we be using

to evaluate options for getting back on

schedule?

Stever: We should get back on schedule

in a way that is least disruptive to

people’s personal lives. We should also

keep costs reasonable, but that’s a second

priority.

Tim: What other options are you

think ing of?

Stever: We could use the design from

our last product. We could use whatever

the designer has done so far and hope

that it’s good enough. We could hire an

intern to work on the instruction book

while the designer works on the product.

Each person Tim talks to will either

reinforce the purpose, criteria, and options,

or add new ones. Tim can work

on reaching alignment during the small

talks, in which case the meeting itself is

just a celebration of the decision that has

already been made.

If we disagree in places, Tim’s ready.

He can Orst highlight where we all agree.

Then the team can work toward alignment

on a common purpose for the

meeting. Once we’re aligned around a

purpose, we can choose the criteria we’ll

use to make the decision. Then we can

gather the options from the small meetings

or brainstorm more, if needed. Last,

we can evaluate and choose an option

using the criteria.

By laying the right predecision

groundwork one-on-one, you can greatly

speed up your decision-making meetings

by arriving with clarity at the three

conversations underlying the decision.

You get the additional bonus of collecting

all the criteria and options the group

might suggest person by person, without

the interpersonal tensions that can prevent

people from speaking up in a group.

Originally published on HBR.org

April 28, 2010

Stever Robbins is the CEO of Ideas

Unleashed, a company that helps thought

leaders turn their audience into income.

He is a serial entrepreneur, a top 10 iTunes

business podcaster (“The Get-It-Done Guy”),

and an executive coach. He has taught at

Babson College on building social capital

and co-led Harvard Business School’s

Foundation design team during the Leadership

and Learning curriculum redesign

initiative.

How to Clone

Your Best

Decision Makers

by Michael C. Mankins

and Lori Sherer

ANY COMPANY’S decisions lie on a spectrum.

On one end are the small, everyday

decisions that add up to a lot of value

over time. Amazon, Capital One, and

others have already Ogured out how to

automate many of these, like whether

to recommend product B to a customer

who buys product A or what spending

limit is appropriate for customers with

certain characteristics.

On the other end of the spectrum

are big, infrequent strategic decisions,

such as where to locate the next $20 billion

manufacturing facility. Companies

assemble all the data and technology

they can Ond to help with such decisions,

including analytics tools such as

Monte Carlo simulations (computational

algorithms that use random sampling to

obtain numerical results). But the choice

ultimately depends on senior executives’

judgment.

In the middle of the spectrum, however,

lies a vast and largely unexplored

territory. These decisions—both relatively

frequent and individually important,

requiring the exercise of judgment

and the application of experience—represent

a potential gold mine for the companies

that get there Orst with advanced

analytics.

Imagine, for example, a property

and casualty company that specializes

in insuring multinational corporations.

For every customer, the company

might have to make risk-assessment

decisions about hundreds of facilities

around the world. Armies of underwriters

make these types of decisions,

with each underwriter more or less experienced

and each one weighing and

Never call a

meeting to

make a decision.

sequencing the dozens of variables

diN erently.

Now imagine that you employ advanced

analytics to codify the approach

of the best, most experienced underwriters.

You build an analytics model that

captures their decision logic. The armies

of underwriters then use that model

in making their decisions. This is not

so much crunching data as simulating

a human process.

What happens? The need for human

knowledge and judgment hasn’t disappeared—you

still require skilled, experienced

employees. But you have changed

the game, using machines to replicate

best human practice. The decision process

now leads to results that are:

• Generally better. Incorporating expert

knowledge makes for more-accurate,

higher-quality decisions.

• More consistent. You have reduced

the variability of decision outcomes.

• More scalable. You can add underwriters

as your business grows and bring

them up to speed more quickly.

In addition, you have suddenly increased

your organization’s test-andlearn

capability. Every outcome for every

insured facility feeds back into the

modeling process, so the model gets better

and better. So do the decisions that

rely on it.

Using analytics in this way is no small

matter. You’ll find that decision processes

are aN ected. And not only do you

need to build the technological capabilities,

you’ll also need to ensure that your

people adopt and use the new tools. The

human element can sidetrack otherwisepromising

experiments.

We know from extensive research that

decisions matter. Companies that make

better and faster decisions, and implement

them eN ectively, turn in better

O nancial performance than rivals and

peers. Focused application of analytics

tools can help companies make better,

quicker decisions—particularly in that

broad middle range—and improve their

performance accordingly.

Originally published on HBR.org

September 9, 2014

Michael C. Mankins is a partner at Bain &

Company. He is based in San Francisco and

formerly led Bain’s organization practice in

the Americas. Lori Sherer is a partner at

Bain & Company in San Francisco and heads

the fi rm’s advanced analytics practice.

READER COMMENTS

The senior underwriters on which the

system is based gained experience by

making mistakes. Where will you fi nd

your next generation of performing underwriters

if the new ones only copy what the

machines did?

—Guillaume Liénard,

corporate fi nance manager,

Allianz Worldwide Partners

The problem with analytics projects is the

assumption that everyone knows what

to measure. Important parts of expert

performance are tacit and unconsciously

competent. You can codify expert decision

strategies into processes and algorithms

only once you know how the best perform.

—Ian McKenna,

managing consultant, Celevere

You need to build the technological

capabilities, but also ensure that

your people adopt and use the tools.

Are you an

effective

manager?

Managing people is fraught

with challenges: What really

motivates people? How do you

deal with problem employees?

How can you build a team that

is greater than the sum of its

parts? Learn how to successfully

leverage the power of people

with HBR’s 10 Must Reads on

Managing People.

US $24.95 | Product #12575

Available as a digital download

or paperback.

Order online at hbr.org

or call toll-free 800-668-6780

(+1-617-783-7450 outside the U.S.

and Canada).

AVAILABLE WHEREVER

BOOKS ARE SOLD

28 Harvard Business Review OnPoint |

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HBR.org

FROM HBR.ORG

VOICES

What Research

Tells Us About

Making Accurate

Predictions

by Walter Frick

“PREDICTION IS very diYcult,” the old

chestnut goes, “especially about the

future.” And for years, social science

agreed. Numerous studies detailed the

forecasting failures of even so-called

experts. Predicting the future is just too

hard, the thinking went; HBR even published

an article (“Six Rules for ENective

Forecasting,” July–August 2007) about

how the art of forecasting wasn’t really

about prediction at all.

That’s changing, thanks to new

research.

We know far more about prediction

than we used to, including the fact that

some of us are better at it than others.

But prediction is also a learned skill, at

least in part—it’s something we can all

become better at with practice. And

that’s good news for businesses, which

have tremendous incentives to predict a

myriad of things.

The most famous research on prediction

was done by Philip Tetlock, of the

University of Pennsylvania. His seminal

book Expert Political Judgment: How

Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princeton

University Press, 2005) provides crucial

background. Tetlock asked a group of

pundits and foreign-aNairs experts to

predict geopolitical events, like whether

the Soviet Union would disintegrate by

1993. Overall, the “experts” struggled

to perform better than “dart-throwing

chimps” and were consistently less accurate

than even relatively simple statistical

algorithms. This was true of liberals

and conservatives, and regardless of professional

credentials.

But Tetlock did uncover one style of

thinking that seemed to aid prediction.

Those who preferred to consider multiple

explanations and balance them

together before making a prediction

performed better than those who relied

on a single big idea. Tetlock called the

Srst group “foxes” and the second group

“hedgehogs,” after the essay “The Hedgehog

and the Fox,” by Isaiah Berlin. As

Tetlock writes:

The intellectually aggressive hedgehogs

knew one big thing and sought,

under the banner of parsimony, to

expand the explanatory power of that

big thing to “cover” new cases; the

more eclectic foxes knew many little

things and were content to improvise

ad hoc solutions to keep pace with

a rapidly changing world.

Since the book, Tetlock and several

colleagues have been running a series

of geopolitical forecasting tournaments

(which I’ve dabbled in) to discover what

helps people make better predictions.

Over the past six months, Tetlock, Barbara

Mellers, and several of their Penn

colleagues have released three new papers

analyzing 150,000 forecasts by 743

participants (all with at least a bachelor’s

degree) competing to predict 199 world

events. One paper focuses solely on highperforming

“superforecasters,” another

looks at the entire group, and a third

makes the case for forecasting tournaments

as a research tool.

The main Snding? Prediction isn’t a

hopeless enterprise—the tournament

participants did far better than blind

chance. Think about a prediction with

two possible outcomes, such as who will

win the Super Bowl. If you pick at random,

you’ll be wrong half the time. But

the best forecasters were consistently

able to cut that error rate by more than

half. As Tetlock put it to me, “The best

forecasters are hovering between the

chimp and God.”

Perhaps most notably, top predictors

managed to improve over time, and

several interventions on the part of the

researchers improved accuracy. So the

second Snding is that it’s possible to get

better at prediction, and the research offers

some insights into the factors that

make a diNerence.

Intelligence helps. The forecasters

in Tetlock’s sample were a smart bunch,

and even within that sample, those who

scored higher on various intelligence

tests tended to make more-accurate

predictions. But intelligence mattered

more early on than it did by the end of

the tournament. It appears that when

you’re entering a new domain and trying

to make predictions, intelligence is a

big advantage. Later, once everyone has

settled in, being smart still helps, but not

quite as much.

Domain expertise helps, too. Forecasters

who scored better on a test of

political knowledge tended to make better

predictions. If that sounds obvious,

remember that Tetlock’s earlier research

found little evidence that expertise matters.

But whereas fancy appointments

Getty Images

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Harvard Business Review OnPoint 29

and credentials might not have correlated

with good prediction in earlier research,

genuine domain expertise does

seem to.

Practice improves accuracy. The

top-performing “superforecasters” were

consistently more accurate, and only became

more so over time. A big part of that

seems to be that they practiced more,

making more predictions and participating

more in the tournament’s forums.

Teams consistently outperform individuals.

The researchers split forecasters

up randomly so that some made their

predictions on their own, while others

did so as part of a group. Groups have

their own problems and biases, as the

article “Making Dumb Groups Smarter”

(HBR, December 2014) explains, so the

researchers gave the groups training on

how to collaborate eNectively. Ultimately,

those who were part of a group made

more-accurate predictions.

Teamwork also helped the superforecasters,

who after the Orst year were put

on teams with one another. This only

improved their accuracy. These superteams

were unique in one other way: As

time passed, most teams became more

divided in their opinions, as participants

became entrenched in their beliefs. By

contrast, the superforecaster teams

agreed more and more over time.

More-open-minded people make

better predictions. This harkens

back to Tetlock’s earlier distinction between

foxes and hedgehogs. Although

participants’ self-reported status as

“fox” or “hedgehog” didn’t predict accuracy,

a commonly used test of openmindedness

did. Whereas some psychologists

see open-mindedness as a

personality trait that’s static within individuals

over time, there is also some

evidence that each of us can be more

or less open-minded depending on the

circumstances.

Training in probability can guard

against bias. Some of the forecasters

received training in “probabilistic reasoning,”

which basically means they

were told to look for data on how similar

cases had turned out in the past before

trying to predict the future. Humans are

surprisingly bad at this and tend to overestimate

the chances that the future will

diNer from the past. The forecasters who

received this training performed better

than those who did not. (Interestingly,

a smaller group was trained in scenario

planning, but this turned out not to be

as useful as the training in probabilistic

reasoning.)

Rushing produces bad predictions.

The longer participants deliberated before

making a forecast, the better they

did. This was particularly true for those

who were working in groups.

Revision leads to better results.

This isn’t quite the same thing as openmindedness,

though it’s probably related.

Forecasters had the option to go back

later on and revise their predictions in response

to new information. Participants

who revised their predictions frequently

outperformed those who did so less often.

Together these Ondings represent a

major step forward in understanding

forecasting. Certainty is the enemy of

accurate prediction, so the unstated prerequisite

to forecasting may be admitting

that we’re usually bad at it. From there,

it’s possible to use a mix of practice and

process to improve.

However, these Ondings don’t speak

to one of the central Ondings of Tetlock’s

earlier work: that humans typically

made worse predictions than algorithms.

Other research has found that one reliable

way to boost humans’ forecasting

ability is to teach them to defer to statistical

models whenever possible. And

the probabilistic reasoning training described

here really just involves teaching

humans to think like simple algorithms.

You could argue that we’re learning

how to make better predictions just in

time to be eclipsed in many domains by

machines, but the real challenge will be

in blending the two. Tetlock’s paper on

the merits of forecasting tournaments is

also about the value of aggregating the

wisdom of the crowd using algorithms.

Ultimately, a mix of data and human

intelligence is likely to outperform either

on its own. The next challenge is

Onding the right algorithm to put them

together.

Originally published on HBR.org

February 2, 2015

Walter Frick is a senior associate editor

at Harvard Business Review.

READER COMMENTS

As data scientists, our goals are to get the

most out of a computer using its data collection

and analysis while acknowledging

its flaws, and then work with human decision

makers, knowing they also are flawed,

to validate the computer’s analysis. This

allows us to get the best of both worlds to

improve predictions.

—Michael Fischer,

president, MF Consultants

No machine in the world would be

able to predict the irrational choices

people make, particularly when under

stress. Data is nice, but we use it to help

us figure out if we are more or less likely

to be wrong about our predictions, not to

help us determine if we are more or less

likely to be right.

Solution

The article focuses on understanding the most common habits that lead to poor decision making. It shows that being lazy and not considering enough data is one of the major reason that people are making ineffective decision. Lack of clarity about vision and its strategic is another reason that people come up with some terrible options. Occurrences of unexpected events in one’s life also cause turbulence which ultimately leads to futile decisions. Reluctance to make some decision and living into the past are some of common behavioural issues that leads to poor decision making by an individual. The article is trying the find out the most common habits and try it substantiate through some instances. It also speaks about the lack of ability to ask question leads to have limited questions which ultimately leads to half-cooked decisions. One should gather more information by asking relevant question and then analyse it so as to have a comprehensive understanding. It leads to evaluation of various possible option and ultimately selecting the best possible option. This process plays an important role in making an effective decision making.

The article is effective in explaining the habits that leads to terrible decision making but doesn’t substantiate it with proper scientific facts. The results are based on some study that is done on some sample but it doesn’t specify the mix of participants. The study also doesn’t categorize that whether it speaks about personal decisions or professional one because the factor keeps on changing for every situation. The article focuses too much on asking questions but it doesn’t emphasize on the type of question that need to be asked so that one should understand the relevance of asking question. The article can speak more about some template or framework that helps in making step by step effective decision making. Reference of practical approach can make this article more interesting and relevant. Currently, it is behavioural in nature.

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