QUESTION 14 Player Player i66 20 B 01 aa Consider the game r

QUESTION 14 Player Player i6,6 20 B 0,1 aa Consider the game represented above in which BOTH Player 1 and Player 2 get a payoff of \"a\" when the strategy profile played is (B,D). Select all that apply If a 1 then strategy B is strictly dominated If a 3/2 then the game has two pure strategy Nash Equilibria. For all values of \"a\" strategy A is strictly dominant For small enough values of a, the profile (A D) is a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium QUESTION 15 D E A 7,1 1,1 player B 5,2 52 C 1,1 7,1 Consider the strategic form game above and select all that apply The game has two pure strategy Nash Equilibria. Strategy B is a best response to strategy D. There is a mixed strategy equilibrium in the game. In the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium of the game Player 1 randomizes between A and C

Solution

14. The correct answers are A and D.

15. The correct answerss are A and C. There is a mixed strategy Nash equilibria and there are 2 pure strategy Nash equilibria.