Question 6 10 points Save Ans 2 32 00 24 54 00 In the extens

Question 6 10 points Save Ans 2 (3,2) (0,0) (2,4) (5,4) (0,0) In the extensive form representation of the game between Player 1 and Player 2, Player 1 moves first and chooses L or R. If Player 1 chooses R the game ends, if Player 1 chooses L then Player 1 and 2 play a simultaneous move game. The game has pure strategy Nash equilibria and pure strategy Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE). The maximum payoff Player 2 gets in a SPNE is . (Please, enter only numerical answers like: 1, 2, 3,.

Solution

We have 4 pure strategy NE here they are as follows

(L,Ar L,Bl R,Ar R,Bl)

We have 2 subgame NE

(R,Ar and L,Bl)

Payoff for player 2 is 4